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Abstract
This paper considers a model of voluntary public good provision with
two players and convex costs. I demonstrate that the provision of public
good is higher in the sequential framework under fairly general conditions.
This outcome shows that introducing convex costs may reverse under some
condition the results of Varian ( 1994).
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1 Introduction
The provision of public good has been investigated by two main approaches of
the literature, one considers the case in which the public goods provided are
continuous and the other one focused the analysis on the case in which the
contributions of the agents are utilized to provide the discrete public goods.
There are many example of voluntary contribution environments: the provi-
sion of a public good by a work team, some members that voluntary contribute
to provide a good for all the components of a community, the donors that give
moneys for a fund raising, two or more countries that contribute in order to
protect the environment, the nations belonging to a Federation that make a
payment to manage the immigration ( Russo, Senatore, 2011). In all the previ-
ous situations the contribution can be made sequentially or simultaneously, in
this paper I mainly analyze how the timing in the contribution can inuence the
total amount of public good provided. Sometimes in a work team one worker
can decide to make an e¤ort before the others or a nation can be rst to commit
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in an agreement on an environmental or migratory problem. Certainly the total
amount of public good provided depends from the timing of the contributions.
Starting from Warr ( 1982, 1983 ) many scholars have analyzed the economic
aspects related to this kind of games. As Warr clearly states ( 1982 ), when the
economic agents contribute voluntary to provide a public good that is motivated
by utility interdependence and it can be observed that a non Pareto optimal
income arises due to the presence of the free rider problem. Afterwards there
have been many other scientic contributions starting from Cornes and Sandler
( 1984 ) and Varian ( 1994 ) that describe why in case there are voluntary
contributions the amount of public good is underprovided because of the free
riding problem. Especially Varian ( 1994 ) examines a game where the agents
decide to contribute sequentially to provide a public good. Basically, using this
framework, he points up that the agent who moves the rst can credibly commit
his contribution, as a consequence he focalizes the analysis on the amount of
public good provided in this situation, comparing this amount with the one
provided in a situation where the agents contribute simultaneously. In order to
analyzes the provision of public good he considers a simultaneous move game
where contributors have a utility function that is quasi -linear in their private
consumption and concave increasing function of public good provided. Varian
gets two results, in case an agent likes the public good more than the other
agent, she contributes the entire amount of public good and the other one free
rides. When the two agents likes the good identically there is a whole range
of equilibrium contribution and, at same time, a unique equilibrium amount
of the public good. Moreover Varian considers the same situation when the
players contribute to the public project sequentially in order to provide a public
good. In his model he searches out other results: in case the agent who likes
the good least is the rst contributor his optimal choice is to contribute zero;
in case the agent that likes the public good the most is the rst contributor,
either contributor may free ride. From the Varians model come out two possible
Stackelberg equilibria: the rst one is also a Nash equilibria because the agent
who likes the public good most contributes everything; the second one is when
the agent who likes the good least contributes everything, but this not a Nash
equilibrium considered that the agent who likes the public most is not a credible
free rider in the simultaneous move game. As a consequence the best situation
for each agent is to move rst, given that there are only two possible outcomes
and the player chooses the one that he prefers. Since Varian considers utility
functions by which the sum of utilities is higher at the higher level of public
good, the higher level of the public good may be provided if the agent who likes
the good least move rst. The central result of Varians model is that, in case
of private provision of public good, it is supplied a less quantity of this good if
the agents move sequentially instead of simultaneously.
Bergstrom et al. (1986) show how a larger redistributions of wealth changes
the set of contributors and consequently the equilibrium provision of public
good. Buchholz, Konrad and Lommerud ( 1997 ) analyses the same model of
Varian ( 1994 ) introducing the transfers in the Stackelberg game of private
provision of a public good. In the Varians Stackelberg equilibrium of private
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provision of public good it is considered the case in which there are equal con-
tribution prices, Buchholz et al. dont remove this condition and examine the
welfare e¤ects of income redistribution. In particular they analyze the case in
which there is a redistribution of income from follower to the leader before the
Stackelberg contribution game, as a result they show how this kind of redistribu-
tion it is Pareto improving that is in contrast with the case of the redistribution
in the Nash outcome. Furthermore, assuming that both contributors have iden-
tical contribution prices, it is clear that the increase of welfare is not related to
a comparative advantage type specialization. Thus the income redistribution
eliminate the incentive for the leader to commit herself to make only a small
contribution. In addition they demonstrate that the follower has an incentive to
make transfers to leader for a wide range of initial distributions of income, so the
transfers received from the leader can induce this agent to become a standalone
contributor in equilibrium.
Kerschbamer and Puppe ( 2001 ) also demonstrate that in the Varians
model of sequential contributions the private provision of a public good is not
neutral if there is an income transfer from the follower to the leader, even if
Varian shows that income transfer from the leader to the follower that do not
exceed the leaders original contribution are neutral. Moreover they discuss the
uniqueness of equilibrium in the sequential set - up. Vesterlund ( 2003 ) points
out the importance of the informational value in a sequential fund-raising. In
contrast with the theoretical predictions many times the fund-raisers choose
to announce the contributions, this paper puts forward that an announcement
strategy maybe optimal because it gives more information about the quality
and the amount of public good provided.
Kempf and Graziosi ( 2010 ) focus their attention on the issue of leadership
when two governments provide a public goods to their citizens with cross border
externalities. Their analysis is strictly related to the Varians model ( 1994 )
and extend the Varians framework in two main directions: rstly they con-
sider a sequential contribution game determining the leadership endogenously
and secondly they dont consider the amounts of contribution as substitutes but
consider all the possible situations. The conclusion of Varians Model remains
valid for the case in which the contribution are substitute and there is an endoge-
nous leadership but fails in case of complementarity between the contributions.
More recently Bag and Roy ( 2011 ) study the inuence of incomplete infor-
mation on sequential and simultaneous contributions. In contrast with the case
of complete information they show that the contributors having independent
private valuations for the public good when contribute sequentially may pro-
vide a large amount of public good respect to the case in which they contribute
simultaneously.
In this paper I consider a pure strategy contribution game in which two
agents completely informed contribute simultaneously and sequentially in order
to provide a continuous public good. For both the utility function is quasi - linear
in their private consumption and concave increasing function of the public good
provided. Furthermore I modify the Varians framework ( 1994 ) introducing
convex costs in the payo¤ functions of the agent. Once I have calculated the total
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amount of public good provided in equilibrium in simultaneous and sequential
game I compare both cases showing that when the contributors has the same
tastes the public good supplied in sequential framework is larger respect to the
case in which the agents contribute simultaneously. This result not conrm
Varian ( 1994 ). I repeat the same comparison introducing the possibility that
the players have a kind of conict in the preferences, in other words when one
player likes more the public good the other one likes it less and viceversa. In this
case the Varians result is not conrmed as well. It is not the aim of this paper
to develop an e¢ ciencys analysis or determine normative issue, basically I want
to point out under which condition the sequential contribution may determine
a higher amount of the public good provided respect to the sequential scheme
and which are the main economic reason of this result.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the Section 2 I describe the contribution
game model. In the Section 3 I compare the total amount of public good pro-
vided in sequential and simultaneous game with agents having same preferences
and convex cost. In Section 4 I develop the same analysis of Section 3 intro-
ducing an heterogeneity in the utility function of the contributors. The Section
5 concludes. The Section 6 and 7 are the Appendixes A and B containing the
proofs.
2 The model
Two agents, C and L contribute respectively an amount of money gC and gL
in order to provide a continuous public good G = gC + gL. Each of them has
a wealth wi , with i = C;L, and distributes it between private consumption
xi  0 and the contribution to a public good gi  0. As in Varians model
( 1994 ) I assume that the agents utility function is quasi - linear in their
private consumption and a concave increasing function of G. If for any values
of wealth wi it is always bigger than
 
gi that is the amount of public good that
maximizes agent i0s utility, then it is possible to remove the wealth wi from the
utility function. Unlike the Varians model ( 1994 ) the cost of contribution is
quadratic instead of linear and there is a parameter  > 1.
The payo¤s of each agent are:
UC (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
C
2
(1)
UL (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
L
2
(2)
with 0 <  < 1
This is a non - cooperative game in pure strategies, the agents have perfect
information and common knowledge.
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3 Simultaneous v/s Sequential contribution with
same preferences and convex costs
I start the analysis considering the situation in which the agents contribute
simultaneously to provide a continuous public good, then I consider the case
in which the contribution is made sequentially, at the end I compare the total
amount of public good provided in both cases. The aim is to show in which
scenario the total amount of public good provided is bigger.
3.1 Simultaneous Contributions with same preferences
Firstly I consider the case in which the utility functions are identical, then the
two agents have the same tastes and the pay o¤ functions can be rewritten in
the following way:
For C the pay o¤ function is
UC (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
C
2
(3)
and for L the pay o¤ function is
UL (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
L
2
(4)
with 0 <  < 1. Each agent, at simultaneous non -cooperative equilibrium,
chooses the optimal amount of contribution that maximizes her pay o¤. The
rst order condition of agent C is
max
gC>0
UC (gC ; gL) ; gL given (5)
the rst order condition of agent L is
max
gL>0
UL (gC ; gL) ; gC given (6)
The Nash equilibrium of this game
 
gSimC ; g
Sim
L

is a pair that must satisfy
simultaneously the conditions 5 and 6. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium in
which the total sum of contribution is :
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=

2

 1
2 
(7)
the 7 is the total amount of public good provided in the simultaneous game
with identical utility function.
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Claim 2 For any values of  and , the total amount of public good provided
in the simultaneous game is

2

 1
2 
( See Appendix A.1 )
It is trivial to remark that in equilibrium the players split exactly the total
amount of the contributions. When the players have the same preferences there
is a unique Nash Equilibrium in which they maximize giving the same single
amount of contribution.
3.2 Sequential Contributions with same preferences
Starting from the situation in which the players have the same preferences I
analyze the situation in which they contribute sequentially, I consider again the
payo¤ functions 3 and 4 . Suppose that the rst mover is the contributor C.
Solving the game by backward induction I dene the rst order condition for
player L
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gL: (8)
Then I calculate the rst order condition for agent C given the optimal
chosen strategy of agent L in the rst stage of the contribution game
(gC + gL)
 1  (1 + g0L(gC)) = gC (9)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the First Order Condition of
player L, I can rewrite the FOC of player C in the following way( See Appendix
A.2 )
(gC + gL)
 1 
"
1   (   1) (gC + gL)
 2
 (   1) (gC + gL) 2   
#
= gC (10)
Solving the system with the two First Order Condition I get the following
quadratic equation:


(   1) (gC + gL)2 4   (gC + gL) 2 (1 + ) + 

= 0 (11)
Claim 3 For any values of  and , the solutions of the quadratic equation 11
correspond to

gSeqC + g
Seq
L
 2
. Given that, the total amount of public good
provided in the sequential game is

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

=
 
2  ( 1)
(1+) 2
q
1+2+2 4  ( 1)
! 1
2 
( See Appendix A.2 )
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3.3 Comparison between the total amount of Public Good
provided in simultaneous and sequential game
To compare the total amount of Public Good provided in the case when the
players contribute simultaneously with the situation in which they interact se-
quentially, I investigate if the following inequality it is veried
0@ 2 (   1)
(1 + )  2
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
1A 12  > 2

 1
2 
(12)
As is clear the left hand side of the 12 is the total amount of public good
provided in sequential game while the right hand side corresponds to the total
amount of public good provided in simultaneous game. Furthermore I consider
exclusively the positive values of the expression on the left hand of 12 because
for negative values the public good it is not provided. (See Appendix B.1).
By solving 12 , it is straightforward to conclude that total contribution is
higher in the sequential regime. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In a two stages contribution game, with convex costs and a
concave increasing utility function of public good, the total amount of public
good provided is larger when the players contribute sequentially.
Proof. See Appendix B.1
The proposition states that the sequential game dominates the simultane-
ous game in terms of total contribution. In this case the players have same
preferences and same cost functions. This result contradicts Varian (1994) on
condition that the two contributors face convex costs.
4 Contribution game with heterogeneous pref-
erences and convex costs
Let me introduce the case in which the two contributors have di¤erent tastes as
previously described two agents, C and L contribute respectively an amount of
money gC and gL in order to provide a continuous public good G = gC + gL.
Each of them has a wealth wi , with i = C;L, and distributes it between private
consumption xi  0 and the contribution to a public good gi  0. As in Varians
model ( 1994 ) I assume that the agentsutility function is quasi - linear in their
private consumption and a concave increasing function of G = gC+gL. If for any
values of the wealth wi it is always bigger than
 
gi that is the amount of public
good that maximizes agent i0s utility, I can remove the wealth wi from the utility
function. Unlike the Varians model ( 1994 ) the cost of contribution is quadratic
instead of linear and the utility function is a¤ected from a parameter  2 [0; 1].
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The parameter  denes the situations in which the provision of public good
G can increase the utility of one agent diminishing the utility of the other one
involved in the contribution game, in other word if one contributor prefers more
public good the other one prefers less determining a conict between the agents
utilities, then the payo¤s of each agent are:
UC (gC ; gL) =  (gC + gL)
   g
2
C
2
(13)
UL (gC ; gL) = (1  ) (gC + gL)   g
2
L
2
(14)
with  < 1 and  2 [0; 1]
Also in this case I analyze a non - cooperative game with pure strategies
,where the agents have perfect information and common knowledge.
5 Simultaneous v/s Sequential contribution with
heterogenous preferences and convex costs
In this part of the paper I also compare the case in which the agents contribute
simultaneously to provide the public good with the case in which they made
a contribution sequentially, at the end I evaluate the total amount of public
good provided in both cases. The aim is to show in which scenario the total
amount of public good provided is bigger and if introducing the heterogeneity
and conict between the preferences the outcome it is di¤erent respect to the
situation in which the agents have the same tastes.
5.1
5.2 Simultaneous Contributions with heterogeneous pref-
erences
Now I consider the case in which the players contribute simultaneously, I con-
sider the payo¤ functions 13 and 14 so there is a kind of heterogeneity in the
utility functions and the costs are convex .
The rst order condition of agent C is
max
gC>0
UC (gC ; gL) ; gL given (15)
the rst order condition of agent L is
8
max
gL>0
UL (gC ; gL) ; gC given (16)
The Nash equilibrium of this game
 
gSimC ; g
Sim
L

is a pair that must satisfy
simultaneously the conditions 15 and 16. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium
in which the total sum of contribution is :
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=



 1
2 
(17)
the 18 is the total amount of public good provided in the simultaneous game
with identical utility function.
Claim 5 For any values of  and , the total amount of public good provided
in the simultaneous game is



 1
2 
( See Appendix A.3 )
In addition the contribution for each agent are the following:
gSimC = 



 1
2 
(18)
gSimL = (1  )



 1
2 
(19)
if  = 0 the contributions in equilibrium for each player are gSimC = 0
and gSimL =



 1
2 
and if  = 1 the contributions in equilibrium are gSimC =


 1
2 
and gSimL = 0:This result shows that the free riding problem occurs
when there is total conict between the two players, indeed in the simultaneous
game when a contributor likes the public good too much gives all the sum in
order to provide the total amount of public good while the other contributor
free rides. Furthermore I can introduce the following proposition
Proposition 6 In a simultaneous contribution game with convex costs, a con-
cave increasing utility function and heterogeneous preferences, the total amount
of public good provided does not depend from the di¤erent tastes of the contrib-
utors .
Clearly as the value of  changes from 0 to 1 each player cover the amount
of public good not provided from the other one in order to not change the level
of public good that maximizes her outcome.
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5.3 Sequential Contributions with heterogeneous prefer-
ences
In this paragraph I consider the case in which the agents play sequentially using
the payo¤ functions 13 and 14. Suppose that the rst mover is the contributor
C. Solving the game by backward induction I dene the rst order condition
for player L
(1  ) (gC + gL) 1   gL = 0 (20)
Then I calculate the rst order condition for agent C given the optimal
chosen strategy of agent L in the rst stage of the contribution game
(gC + gL)
 1  (1 + g0L(gC))  gC = 0 (21)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the First Order Condition of
player L, I can rewrite the FOC of player C in the following way( See Appendix
A.2 )
(gC + gL)
 1 
"
1  (1  ) (   1) (gC + gL)
 2
(1  ) (   1) (gC + gL) 2   
#
= gC (22)
Solving the system with the two First Order Condition I get the following
quadratic equation:
(1  )2  (   1) (gC + gL)2 4

  (gC + gL) 2 (    (   1)) + 

= 0 (23)
Claim 7 For any values of  and , the solutions of the quadratic equation 24
correspond to

gSeqC + g
Seq
L
 2
. Given that, the total amount of public good
provided in the sequential game is

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

=

2(1 )2  ( 1)
 ( 1) 2
p
( ( 1))2 4(1 )2( 1)
 1
2 
( See Appendix A.3 )
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5.4 Comparison between the total amount of Public Good
provided in simultaneous and sequential game with
convex costs and heterogeneous utility functions
The comparison between the sequential and the simultaneous contribution game
can be carry out solving the following inequality
0@ 2 (1  )2  (   1)
    (   1) 2
q
(    (   1))2   4 (1  )2  (   1)
1A 12  > 

 1
2 
(24)
As is clear the left hand side of the 24 is the total amount of public good
provided in sequential game while the right hand side corresponds to the total
amount of public good provided in simultaneous game. As in the case of same
preferences I consider exclusively the positive values of the expression on the
left hand of 24 because for negative values the public good it is not provided.
(See Appendix B.2).
By comparing the equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, it is straightforward
to conclude that total contribution is higher in the sequential regime.
This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In a two stages contribution game, with convex cost and a con-
cave increasing and heterogeneous utility functions, the total amount of public
good provided it is always larger when the players contribute sequentially.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
The proposition simply states that the sequential game dominates the si-
multaneous game in terms of total contribution. Also in case there is a conict
between the players on the total amount of the public good to provide the re-
sult not conrms Varian (1994), this implies that the existence of convex costs
determines an increase of public good provided when the players contribute
sequentially .
6 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper has several implications for public goods
provision in the presence of convex costs. In contrast to Varian ( 1994 ), in
presence of convex and identical preferences the public good supplied is larger
in sequential framework. This result shows that the introduction of timing in
some circumstances can assure an high level of public good provided even in
presence of the free rider problem. Furthermore even in case the contributors
11
have di¤erent taste and conict in the preferences, more precisely when the
increase in the utility of one agent automatically decreases the utility of the
other agent the Varians result is not conrmed. It is possible to conclude that
with convex costs in order to provide more public good the sequential framework
in the contributions is preferable.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Appendix A.1: Total Amount of Public Good Pro-
vided in Simultaneous Game with convex costs
UC (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
C
2
(Payo¤ of Player C)
UL (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
L
2
(Payo¤ of Player L)
FOC for player gC ; @UC@gC = 0; gives:
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gC : (FOCC)
SOC clearly satised.
FOC for player gL; @UL@gL = 0; gives:
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gL: (FOCL)
SOC clearly satised.
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=

2

 1
2 
The total contribution in the simultaneous game equilibrium is:
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=

2

 1
2 
(TOTAL CONTRIBUTION)
7.2 Appendix A.2 Total Amount of Public Good Provided
in Sequential Game with convex costs
UC (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
C
2
(Payo¤ of Player C)
UL (gC ; gL) = (gC + gL)
   g
2
L
2
(Payo¤ of Player L)
FOC for player L; @UL@gL = 0
 (gC + gL)
 1   gL = 0
13
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gL (FOCL)
substituting in UC
UC = (gC + gL(gC))
   g
2
C
2
@UC
@gC
= (gC + gL)
 1  (1 + g0L(gC))  gC
Applying the IFT to the FOC of player C, I can rewrite the FOC of player
C in the following way
@UC
@gC
= (gC + gL)
 1 
"
1   (   1) (gC + gL)
 2
 (   1) (gC + gL) 2   
#
  gC
FOC for player C;@UC@gC = 0
(gC + gL)
 1 
"
1   (   1) (gC + gL)
 2
 (   1) (gC + gL) 2   
#
= gC (FOCC)
In that way the players maximize sequentially and I can build a system in
order to get the value of gC + gL the two FOCs
(
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gL
(gC + gL)
 1 
h
1  ( 1)(gC+gL) 2
( 1)(gC+gL) 2 
i
= gC
Solving the system I get:
2 (   1) (gC + gL)2 4  (gC + gL) 2  (   1) (gC + gL) 2+ (   1) (gC + gL) 2+2 = 0
that is nothing else that a quadratic equation where is possible to calculate
the value of (gC + gL)
 2, so the two solutions are
(gC + gL)
 2
=
(1 + )
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
2 (   1)
from these solutions I have the possibility to calculate the total amount of
public good provided in sequential game.
gSeqC + g
Seq
L =
0@ (1 + )
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
2 (   1)
1A
1
2 
14
7.3
7.4 Appendix A.3 Total Amount of Public Good Provided
in Simultaneous Game with convex costs and hetero-
geneity in the preferences
The payo¤ functions of the two contributors are the following
Uc =  (gC + gL)
   1
2
g2C (Payo¤ of Player C)
Uc = (1  ) (gC + gL)   1
2
g2L (Payo¤ of Player L)
where 0 <  < 1 and  2 [0; 1]:
FOC for player C; @Uc@c = 0; gives:
 (gC + gL)
 1
= gC : (FOCL)
SOC clearly satised.
FOC for player L; @Ul@l = 0; gives:
(1  ) (gC + gL) 1 = gL: (FOCC)
SOC clearly satised.
Solving the system with the two FOCs I get the total contribution in the
simultaneous game:
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=



 1
2 
(TOTAL CONTRIBUTION)
which does not depend on :
7.5 Appendix A.4 Total Amount of Public Good Provided
in Sequential Game with convex costs and heterogene-
ity in the preferences
The payo¤ functions of the two contributors are the following
Uc =  (gC + gL)
   1
2
g2C (Payo¤ of Player C)
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Uc = (1  ) (gC + gL)   1
2
g2L (Payo¤ of Player L)
where 0 <  < 1 and  2 [0; 1]:
The agent C contributes rst so we solve the game by using the backward
induction:
FOC for player L; @Ul@gL = 0; gives:
(1  ) (gC + gL) 1 = gL: (FOCL)
SOC clearly satised.
substituting in UC
UC =  (gC + gL(gC))
   g
2
C
2
FOC for player C;@UC@gC = 0
@UC
@gC
= (gC + gL)
 1  (1 + g0L(gC))  gC (FOCC)
Applying the IFT to the FOC of player C, I calculate calculate dgLdgC from
the FOC of L I can rewrite the FOC of player C in the following way
@UC
@gC
= (gC + gL)
 1 
"
1  (1  ) (   1) (gC + gL)
 2
(1  ) (   1) (gC + gL) 2   
#
  gC
now I can build a system in order to get the value of gC + gL the two FOCs
(
(1  ) (gC + gL) 1 = gL
(gC + gL)
 1 
h
1  (1 )( 1)(gC+gL) 2
(1 )( 1)(gC+gL) 2 
i
= gC
Solving the system I get::
(1  )2 2 (   1) (gC + gL)2 4    (gC + gL) 2 
  (   1) (gC + gL) 2 +  (   1) (gC + gL) 2 + 2 = 0
that expression is nothing else that a quadratic equation from which it is
possible to calculate the value of (gC + gL)
 2, so the two solutions are:
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(gC + gL)
 2
=
(    (   1)) 2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
2 (1  )2  (   1)
from these solutions I have the possibility to calculate the total amount of
public good provided in sequential game.
gSeqC +g
Seq
L =
0@ 2 (1  )2  (   1)
(    (   1)) 2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
1A 12 
8 Appendix B
8.1 Appendix B.1: Proof of Proposition 2
I want to prove that

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

>
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

the total amount of public
good provided is higher in sequential game.
The total amount of public good provided in the simultaneous scenario is
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=

2

 1
2 
(b:1:1)
the total amount of public good provided in the sequential scenario corre-
sponds to the positive solutions of the following expression:

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

=
0@ 2 (   1)
(1 + ) 2
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
1A 12  (b:1:2)
Comparing the two values
0@ 2 (   1)
(1 + ) 2
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
1A 12  > 2

 1
2 
(b:1:3)
I have to consider only positive values of public good provided, so I nd
which expression of the right hand side of b:1:3 ensures positive values.
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The numerator of the right hand side of b:1:3 is negative so I have to use an
expression of denominator that is negative in order to consider only the case in
which the total amount of public good provided is positive
(1 + ) 
s
1 + 2 + 2   4

(   1) 

< 0 (b:1:4)
then I get:
4  4 > 0
so the b:1:4 it is veried.
Then I evaluate the following inequality in order to prove if the

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

> 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

2 (   1)
(1 + )  2
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
>
2

(b:1:5)
dividing both side by 2 (   1) I get
1
(1 + )  2
q
1 + 2 + 2   4 (   1) 
<
1
   1 (b:1:6)
+2   2 + 1 > 0 (b:1:7)
the b:1:7 it is veried for every values of  except for  = 1, remind that
in the model 0 <  < 1 so b:1:5 is veried this prove that the total amount of
public good provided is higher in sequential game.
8.2
8.3 Appendix B.2: Proof of Proposition 3
I want to prove that

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

>
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

the total amount of public
good provided is higher in sequential game.
The total amount of public good provided in the simultaneous scenario is
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

=



 1
2 
(b:2:1)
the total amount of public good provided in the sequential scenario corre-
sponds to the positive solutions of the following expression:
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
gSeqC + g
Seq
L

=
0@ 2 (1  )2  (   1)
(    (   1)) 2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
1A 12 
Comparing the two values
0@ 2 (1  )2  (   1)
(    (   1)) 2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
1A 12  > 

 1
2 
(b:2:2)
I
I have to consider only positive values of public good provided, so I nd
which expression of the right hand side of b:2:2 ensures positive values.
The numerator of the right hand side of b:2:3 is negative so I have to use an
expression of denominator that is negative in order to consider only the case in
which the total amount of public good provided is positive
    (   1)  2
q
(    (   1))2   4 (1  )2 (   1) < 0 (b:2:3)
 4 (1  )2 (   1) > 0
the b:2:3 it is veried so I evaluate the following inequality in order to prove
if the

gSeqC + g
Seq
L

>
 
gSimC + g
Sim
L

is
2 (1  )2  (   1)
(    (   1))  2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
>


(b:2:4)
dividing both side by 2 (1  )2  (   1) I get
1
(    (   1))  2
q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2  (   1)
<
1
2 (1  )2 (   1)
(b:2:5)
both sides are negative so I have to show that
(    (   1))  2
s
(    (   1))2   4

 (1  )2 

(   1) < 2 (1  )2 (   1)
(b:2:7)
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2q
(    (   1))2   4  (1  )2 (   1) >  2 (1  )2 (   1) +     (   1)
dividing by (1  )2and (   1) that is negative
 4 < 4 (1  )2 (   1)  4 + 4 (   1)
that is
0 < 1   (b:2:8)
b:2:8 it is veried because 0 <  < 1 so b:2:5 is veried and this prove that
the total amount of public good provided is higher in sequential game.
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